List of usage examples for java.net SocketException getClass
@HotSpotIntrinsicCandidate public final native Class<?> getClass();
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.ascanrules.TestSQLInjection.java
/** scans for SQL Injection vulnerabilities */ @Override//from w w w. j a v a 2 s .c om public void scan(HttpMessage msg, String param, String origParamValue) { // Note: the "value" we are passed here is escaped. we need to unescape it before handling // it. // as soon as we find a single SQL injection on the url, skip out. Do not look for SQL // injection on a subsequent parameter on the same URL // for performance reasons. // reinitialise each parameter. sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = false; sqlInjectionAttack = null; refreshedmessage = null; mResBodyNormalUnstripped = null; mResBodyNormalStripped = null; try { // reinitialise the count for each type of request, for each parameter. We will be // sticking to limits defined in the attach strength logic countErrorBasedRequests = 0; countExpressionBasedRequests = 0; countBooleanBasedRequests = 0; countUnionBasedRequests = 0; countOrderByBasedRequests = 0; // Check 1: Check for Error Based SQL Injection (actual error messages). // for each SQL metacharacter combination to try for (int sqlErrorStringIndex = 0; sqlErrorStringIndex < SQL_CHECK_ERR.length && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doSpecificErrorBased && countErrorBasedRequests < doErrorMaxRequests; sqlErrorStringIndex++) { // work through the attack using each of the following strings as a prefix: the // empty string, and the original value // Note: this doubles the amount of work done by the scanner, but is necessary in // some cases String[] prefixStrings; if (origParamValue != null) { // ZAP: Removed getURLDecode() prefixStrings = new String[] { "", origParamValue }; } else { prefixStrings = new String[] { "" }; } for (int prefixIndex = 0; prefixIndex < prefixStrings.length && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl; prefixIndex++) { // new message for each value we attack with HttpMessage msg1 = getNewMsg(); String sqlErrValue = prefixStrings[prefixIndex] + SQL_CHECK_ERR[sqlErrorStringIndex]; setParameter(msg1, param, sqlErrValue); // System.out.println("Attacking [" + msg + "], parameter [" + param + "] with // value ["+ sqlErrValue + "]"); // send the message with the modified parameters try { sendAndReceive(msg1, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msg1.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); continue; // Something went wrong, continue to the next prefixString in the // loop } countErrorBasedRequests++; // now check the results against each pattern in turn, to try to identify a // database, or even better: a specific database. // Note: do NOT check the HTTP error code just yet, as the result could come // back with one of various codes. for (RDBMS rdbms : RDBMS.values()) { if (getTechSet().includes(rdbms.getTech()) && checkSpecificErrors(rdbms, msg1, param, sqlErrValue)) { sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; // Save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if // necessary sqlInjectionAttack = sqlErrValue; break; } // bale out if we were asked nicely if (isStop()) { log.debug("Stopping the scan due to a user request"); return; } } // end of the loop to check for RDBMS specific error messages if (this.doGenericErrorBased && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl) { Iterator<Pattern> errorPatternIterator = RDBMS.GenericRDBMS.getErrorPatterns().iterator(); while (errorPatternIterator.hasNext() && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl) { Pattern errorPattern = errorPatternIterator.next(); String errorPatternRDBMS = RDBMS.GenericRDBMS.getName(); // if the "error message" occurs in the result of sending the modified // query, but did NOT occur in the original result of the original query // then we may may have a SQL Injection vulnerability StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); if (!matchBodyPattern(getBaseMsg(), errorPattern, null) && matchBodyPattern(msg1, errorPattern, sb)) { // Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( MESSAGE_PREFIX + "alert.errorbased.extrainfo", errorPatternRDBMS, errorPattern.toString()); // raise the alert, and save the attack string for the // "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = sqlErrValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, getName() + " - " + errorPatternRDBMS, getDescription(), null, param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), sb.toString(), msg1); // log it, as the RDBMS may be useful to know later (in subsequent // checks, when we need to determine RDBMS specific behaviour, for // instance) getKb().add(getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI(), "sql/" + errorPatternRDBMS, Boolean.TRUE); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; continue; } // bale out if we were asked nicely if (isStop()) { log.debug("Stopping the scan due to a user request"); return; } } // end of the loop to check for RDBMS specific error messages } } // for each of the SQL_CHECK_ERR values (SQL metacharacters) } // ############################### // Check 4 // New! I haven't seen this technique documented anywhere else, but it's dead simple. // Let me explain. // See if the parameter value can simply be changed to one that *evaluates* to be the // same value, // if evaluated on a database // the simple check is to see if parameter "1" gives the same results as for param // "2-1", and different results for param "2-2" // for now, we try this for integer values only. // ############################### // Since the previous checks are attempting SQL injection, and may have actually // succeeded in modifying the database (ask me how I know?!) // then we cannot rely on the database contents being the same as when the original // query was last run (could be hours ago) // so to work around this, simply re-run the query again now at this point. // Note that we are not counting this request in our max number of requests to be issued refreshedmessage = getNewMsg(); try { sendAndReceive(refreshedmessage, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); return; // Something went wrong, no point continuing } // String mResBodyNormal = getBaseMsg().getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalUnstripped = refreshedmessage.getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalStripped = this.stripOff(mResBodyNormalUnstripped, origParamValue); if (!sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doExpressionBased && countExpressionBasedRequests < doExpressionMaxRequests) { // first figure out the type of the parameter.. try { // is it an integer type? // ZAP: removed URLDecoding because on Variants // int paramAsInt = // Integer.parseInt(TestSQLInjection.getURLDecode(origParamValue)); int paramAsInt = Integer.parseInt(origParamValue); if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("The parameter value [" + origParamValue + "] is of type Integer"); } // This check is implemented using two variant PLUS(+) and MULT(*) try { // PLUS variant check the param value "3-2" gives same result as original // request and param value "4-2" gives different result if original param // value is 1 // set the parameter value to a string value like "3-2", if the original // parameter value was "1" int paramPlusTwo = addWithOverflowCheck(paramAsInt, 2); String modifiedParamValueForAdd = String.valueOf(paramPlusTwo) + "-2"; // set the parameter value to a string value like "4-2", if the original // parameter value was "1" int paramPlusThree = addWithOverflowCheck(paramAsInt, 3); String modifiedParamValueConfirmForAdd = String.valueOf(paramPlusThree) + "-2"; // Do the attack for ADD variant expressionBasedAttack(param, origParamValue, modifiedParamValueForAdd, modifiedParamValueConfirmForAdd); // bale out if we were asked nicely if (isStop()) { log.debug("Stopping the scan due to a user request"); return; } // MULT variant check the param value "2/2" gives same result as original // request and param value "4/2" gives different result if original param // value is 1 if (!sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && countExpressionBasedRequests < doExpressionMaxRequests) { // set the parameter value to a string value like "2/2", if the original // parameter value was "1" int paramMultTwo = multiplyWithOverflowCheck(paramAsInt, 2); String modifiedParamValueForMult = String.valueOf(paramMultTwo) + "/2"; // set the parameter value to a string value like "4/2", if the original // parameter value was "1" int paramMultFour = multiplyWithOverflowCheck(paramAsInt, 4); String modifiedParamValueConfirmForMult = String.valueOf(paramMultFour) + "/2"; // Do the attack for MULT variant expressionBasedAttack(param, origParamValue, modifiedParamValueForMult, modifiedParamValueConfirmForMult); // bale out if we were asked nicely if (isStop()) { log.debug("Stopping the scan due to a user request"); return; } } } catch (ArithmeticException ex) { if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + "When performing integer math with the parameter value [" + origParamValue + "]"); } } } catch (Exception e) { if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("The parameter value [" + origParamValue + "] is NOT of type Integer"); } // TODO: implement a similar check for string types? This probably needs to be // RDBMS specific (ie, it should not live in this scanner) } } // Check 2: boolean based checks. // the check goes like so: // append " and 1 = 1" to the param. Send the query. Check the results. Hopefully they // match the original results from the unmodified query, // *suggesting* (but not yet definitely) that we have successfully modified the query, // (hopefully not gotten an error message), // and have gotten the same results back, which is what you would expect if you added // the constraint " and 1 = 1" to most (but not every) SQL query. // So was it a fluke that we got the same results back from the modified query? Perhaps // the original query returned 0 rows, so adding any number of // constraints would change nothing? It is still a possibility! // check to see if we can change the original parameter again to *restrict* the scope of // the query using an AND with an always false condition (AND_ERR) // (decreasing the results back to nothing), or to *broaden* the scope of the query // using an OR with an always true condition (AND_OR) // (increasing the results). // If we can successfully alter the results to our requirements, by one means or // another, we have found a SQL Injection vulnerability. // Some additional complications: assume there are 2 HTML parameters: username and // password, and the SQL constructed is like so: // select * from username where user = "$user" and password = "$password" // and lets assume we successfully know the type of the user field, via SQL_OR_TRUE // value '" OR "1"="1' (single quotes not part of the value) // we still have the problem that the actual SQL executed would look like so: // select * from username where user = "" OR "1"="1" and password = "whateveritis" // Since the password field is still taken into account (by virtue of the AND condition // on the password column), and we only inject one parameter at a time, // we are still not in control. // the solution is simple: add an end-of-line comment to the field added in (in this // example: the user field), so that the SQL becomes: // select * from username where user = "" OR "1"="1" -- and password = "whateveritis" // the result is that any additional constraints are commented out, and the last // condition to have any effect is the one whose // HTTP param we are manipulating. // Note also that because this comment only needs to be added to the "SQL_OR_TRUE" and // not to the equivalent SQL_AND_FALSE, because of the nature of the OR // and AND conditions in SQL. // Corollary: If a particular RDBMS does not offer the ability to comment out the // remainder of a line, we will not attempt to comment out anything in the query // and we will simply hope that the *last* constraint in the SQL query is // constructed from a HTTP parameter under our control. if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Doing Check 2, since check 1 did not match for " + getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI()); } // Since the previous checks are attempting SQL injection, and may have actually // succeeded in modifying the database (ask me how I know?!) // then we cannot rely on the database contents being the same as when the original // query was last run (could be hours ago) // so to work around this, simply re-run the query again now at this point. // Note that we are not counting this request in our max number of requests to be issued refreshedmessage = getNewMsg(); try { sendAndReceive(refreshedmessage, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); return; // Something went wrong, no point continuing } // String mResBodyNormal = getBaseMsg().getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalUnstripped = refreshedmessage.getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalStripped = this.stripOff(mResBodyNormalUnstripped, origParamValue); // boolean booleanBasedSqlInjectionFoundForParam = false; // try each of the AND syntax values in turn. // Which one is successful will depend on the column type of the table/view column into // which we are injecting the SQL. for (int i = 0; i < SQL_LOGIC_AND_TRUE.length && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doBooleanBased && countBooleanBasedRequests < doBooleanMaxRequests; i++) { // needs a new message for each type of AND to be issued HttpMessage msg2 = getNewMsg(); // ZAP: Removed getURLDecode() String sqlBooleanAndTrueValue = origParamValue + SQL_LOGIC_AND_TRUE[i]; String sqlBooleanAndFalseValue = origParamValue + SQL_LOGIC_AND_FALSE[i]; setParameter(msg2, param, sqlBooleanAndTrueValue); // send the AND with an additional TRUE statement tacked onto the end. Hopefully it // will return the same results as the original (to find a vulnerability) try { sendAndReceive(msg2, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msg2.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); continue; // Something went wrong, continue to the next item in the loop } countBooleanBasedRequests++; // String resBodyAND = msg2.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyANDTrueUnstripped = msg2.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyANDTrueStripped = stripOffOriginalAndAttackParam(resBodyANDTrueUnstripped, origParamValue, sqlBooleanAndTrueValue); // set up two little arrays to ease the work of checking the unstripped output, and // then the stripped output String normalBodyOutput[] = { mResBodyNormalUnstripped, mResBodyNormalStripped }; String andTrueBodyOutput[] = { resBodyANDTrueUnstripped, resBodyANDTrueStripped }; boolean strippedOutput[] = { false, true }; for (int booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex = 0; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex < 2; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex++) { // if the results of the "AND 1=1" match the original query (using either the // stipped or unstripped versions), we may be onto something. if (andTrueBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) == 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Check 2, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for AND TRUE condition [" + sqlBooleanAndTrueValue + "] matched (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); } // so they match. Was it a fluke? See if we get the same result by tacking // on "AND 1 = 2" to the original HttpMessage msg2_and_false = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg2_and_false, param, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue); try { sendAndReceive(msg2_and_false, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msg2_and_false.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); continue; // Something went wrong, continue on to the next item in the // loop } countBooleanBasedRequests++; // String resBodyANDFalse = // stripOff(msg2_and_false.getResponseBody().toString(), // SQL_LOGIC_AND_FALSE[i]); // String resBodyANDFalse = msg2_and_false.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyANDFalseUnstripped = msg2_and_false.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyANDFalseStripped = stripOffOriginalAndAttackParam(resBodyANDFalseUnstripped, origParamValue, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue); String andFalseBodyOutput[] = { resBodyANDFalseUnstripped, resBodyANDFalseStripped }; // which AND False output should we compare? the stripped or the unstripped // version? // depends on which one we used to get to here.. use the same as that.. // build an always false AND query. Result should be different to prove the // SQL works. if (andFalseBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) != 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Check 2, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for AND FALSE condition [" + sqlBooleanAndFalseValue + "] differed from (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); } // it's different (suggesting that the "AND 1 = 2" appended on gave // different results because it restricted the data set to nothing // Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = null; if (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) { extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( MESSAGE_PREFIX + "alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanAndTrueValue, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue, ""); } else { extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( MESSAGE_PREFIX + "alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanAndTrueValue, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue, "NOT "); } extraInfo = extraInfo + "\n" + Constant.messages .getString(MESSAGE_PREFIX + "alert.booleanbased.extrainfo.dataexists"); // raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication // Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = sqlBooleanAndTrueValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, getName(), getDescription(), null, // url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), "", msg2); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; break; // No further need to loop through SQL_AND } else { // the results of the always false condition are the same as for the // original unmodified parameter // this could be because there was *no* data returned for the original // unmodified parameter // so consider the effect of adding comments to both the always true // condition, and the always false condition // the first value to try.. // ZAP: Removed getURLDecode() String orValue = origParamValue + SQL_LOGIC_OR_TRUE[i]; // this is where that comment comes in handy: if the RDBMS supports // one-line comments, add one in to attempt to ensure that the // condition becomes one that is effectively always true, returning ALL // data (or as much as possible), allowing us to pinpoint the SQL // Injection if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Check 2 , " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for AND FALSE condition [" + sqlBooleanAndFalseValue + "] SAME as (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI() + " ### (forcing OR TRUE check) "); } HttpMessage msg2_or_true = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg2_or_true, param, orValue); try { sendAndReceive(msg2_or_true, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msg2_or_true.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); continue; // Something went wrong, continue on to the next item in // the loop } countBooleanBasedRequests++; // String resBodyORTrue = // stripOff(msg2_or_true.getResponseBody().toString(), orValue); // String resBodyORTrue = msg2_or_true.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyORTrueUnstripped = msg2_or_true.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyORTrueStripped = stripOffOriginalAndAttackParam(resBodyORTrueUnstripped, origParamValue, orValue); String orTrueBodyOutput[] = { resBodyORTrueUnstripped, resBodyORTrueStripped }; int compareOrToOriginal = orTrueBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]); if (compareOrToOriginal != 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Check 2, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for OR TRUE condition [" + orValue + "] different to (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); } // it's different (suggesting that the "OR 1 = 1" appended on gave // different results because it broadened the data set from nothing // to something // Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = null; if (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) { extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( MESSAGE_PREFIX + "alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanAndTrueValue, orValue, ""); } else { extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( MESSAGE_PREFIX + "alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanAndTrueValue, orValue, "NOT "); } extraInfo = extraInfo + "\n" + Constant.messages .getString(MESSAGE_PREFIX + "alert.booleanbased.extrainfo.datanotexists"); // raise the alert, and save the attack string for the // "Authentication Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = orValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, getName(), getDescription(), null, // url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), "", msg2); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; // booleanBasedSqlInjectionFoundForParam = true; //causes us to // skip past the other entries in SQL_AND. Only one will expose a // vuln for a given param, since the database column is of only 1 // type break; // No further need to loop } } } // if the results of the "AND 1=1" match the original query, we may be onto // something. else { // andTrueBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex].compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) // the results of the "AND 1=1" do NOT match the original query, for // whatever reason (no sql injection, or the web page is not stable) if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Check 2, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for AND condition [" + sqlBooleanAndTrueValue + "] does NOT match the (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); Patch diffpatch = DiffUtils.diff( new LinkedList<String>(Arrays .asList(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex].split("\\n"))), new LinkedList<String>(Arrays.asList( andTrueBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex].split("\\n")))); // int numberofDifferences = diffpatch.getDeltas().size(); // and convert the list of patches to a String, joining using a newline StringBuilder tempDiff = new StringBuilder(250); for (Delta delta : diffpatch.getDeltas()) { String changeType = null; if (delta.getType() == Delta.TYPE.CHANGE) { changeType = "Changed Text"; } else if (delta.getType() == Delta.TYPE.DELETE) { changeType = "Deleted Text"; } else if (delta.getType() == Delta.TYPE.INSERT) { changeType = "Inserted text"; } else { changeType = "Unknown change type [" + delta.getType() + "]"; } tempDiff.append("\n(" + changeType + ")\n"); // blank line before tempDiff.append("Output for Unmodified parameter: " + delta.getOriginal() + "\n"); tempDiff.append("Output for modified parameter: " + delta.getRevised() + "\n"); } log.debug("DIFFS: " + tempDiff); } } // bale out if we were asked nicely if (isStop()) { log.debug("Stopping the scan due to a user request"); return; } } // end of boolean logic output index (unstripped + stripped) } // end of check 2 // check 2a: boolean based logic, where the original query returned *no* data. Here we // append " OR 1=1" in an attempt to extract *more* data // and then verify the results by attempting to reproduce the original results by // appending an " AND 1=2" condition (ie "open up first, then restrict to verify") // this differs from the previous logic based check since the previous check assumes // that the original query produced data, and tries first to restrict that data // (ie, it uses "restrict first, open up to verify" ). for (int i = 0; i < SQL_LOGIC_OR_TRUE.length && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doBooleanBased && countBooleanBasedRequests < doBooleanMaxRequests; i++) { HttpMessage msg2 = getNewMsg(); String sqlBooleanOrTrueValue = origParamValue + SQL_LOGIC_OR_TRUE[i]; String sqlBooleanAndFalseValue = origParamValue + SQL_LOGIC_AND_FALSE[i]; setParameter(msg2, param, sqlBooleanOrTrueValue); try { sendAndReceive(msg2, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msg2.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); continue; // Something went wrong, continue on to the next item in the loop } countBooleanBasedRequests++; String resBodyORTrueUnstripped = msg2.getResponseBody().toString(); // if the results of the "OR 1=1" exceed the original query (unstripped, by more // than a 20% size difference, say), we may be onto something. // TODO: change the percentage difference threshold based on the alert threshold if ((resBodyORTrueUnstripped.length() > (mResBodyNormalUnstripped.length() * 1.2))) { if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Check 2a, unstripped html output for OR TRUE condition [" + sqlBooleanOrTrueValue + "] produced sufficiently larger results than the original message"); } // if we can also restrict it back to the original results by appending a " and // 1=2", then "Winner Winner, Chicken Dinner". HttpMessage msg2_and_false = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg2_and_false, param, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue); try { sendAndReceive(msg2_and_false, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msg2_and_false.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); continue; // Something went wrong, continue on to the next item in the loop } countBooleanBasedRequests++; String resBodyANDFalseUnstripped = msg2_and_false.getResponseBody().toString(); String resBodyANDFalseStripped = stripOffOriginalAndAttackParam(resBodyANDFalseUnstripped, origParamValue, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue); // does the "AND 1=2" version produce the same as the original (for // stripped/unstripped versions) boolean verificationUsingUnstripped = resBodyANDFalseUnstripped .compareTo(mResBodyNormalUnstripped) == 0; boolean verificationUsingStripped = resBodyANDFalseStripped .compareTo(mResBodyNormalStripped) == 0; if (verificationUsingUnstripped || verificationUsingStripped) { if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Check 2, " + (verificationUsingStripped ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for AND FALSE condition [" + sqlBooleanAndFalseValue + "] matches the (refreshed) original results"); } // Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = null; if (verificationUsingStripped) { extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString(MESSAGE_PREFIX + "alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanOrTrueValue, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue, ""); } else { extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString(MESSAGE_PREFIX + "alert.booleanbased.extrainfo", sqlBooleanOrTrueValue, sqlBooleanAndFalseValue, "NOT "); } extraInfo = extraInfo + "\n" + Constant.messages .getString(MESSAGE_PREFIX + "alert.booleanbased.extrainfo.datanotexists"); // raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication // Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = sqlBooleanOrTrueValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, getName(), getDescription(), null, // url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), "", msg2); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; break; // No further need to loop } } } // end of check 2a // Check 3: UNION based // for each SQL UNION combination to try for (int sqlUnionStringIndex = 0; sqlUnionStringIndex < SQL_UNION_APPENDAGES.length && !sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doUnionBased && countUnionBasedRequests < doUnionMaxRequests; sqlUnionStringIndex++) { // new message for each value we attack with HttpMessage msg3 = getNewMsg(); String sqlUnionValue = origParamValue + SQL_UNION_APPENDAGES[sqlUnionStringIndex]; setParameter(msg3, param, sqlUnionValue); // send the message with the modified parameters try { sendAndReceive(msg3, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msg3.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); continue; // Something went wrong, continue on to the next item in the loop } countUnionBasedRequests++; // now check the results.. look first for UNION specific error messages in the // output that were not there in the original output // and failing that, look for generic RDBMS specific error messages // TODO: maybe also try looking at a differentiation based approach?? Prone to false // positives though. for (RDBMS rdbms : RDBMS.values()) { if (getTechSet().includes(rdbms.getTech()) && checkUnionErrors(rdbms, msg3, mResBodyNormalStripped, refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI(), param, origParamValue, sqlUnionValue)) { sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; // Save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" alert, if // necessary sqlInjectionAttack = sqlUnionValue; break; } // bale out if we were asked nicely if (isStop()) { log.debug("Stopping the scan due to a user request"); return; } } // end of the loop to check for RDBMS specific UNION error messages } //// for each SQL UNION combination to try // end of check 3 // ############################### // check for columns used in the "order by" clause of a SQL statement. earlier tests // will likely not catch these // append on " ASC -- " to the end of the original parameter. Grab the results. // if the results are different to the original (unmodified parameter) results, then // bale // if the results are the same as for the original parameter value, then the parameter // *might* be influencing the order by // try again for "DESC": append on " DESC -- " to the end of the original parameter. // Grab the results. // if the results are the same as the original (unmodified parameter) results, then bale // (the results are not under our control, or there is no difference in the ordering, // for some reason: 0 or 1 rows only, or ordering // by the first column alone is not sufficient to change the ordering of the data.) // if the results were different to the original (unmodified parameter) results, then // SQL injection!! // Since the previous checks are attempting SQL injection, and may have actually // succeeded in modifying the database (ask me how I know?!) // then we cannot rely on the database contents being the same as when the original // query was last run (could be hours ago) // so to work around this, simply re-run the query again now at this point. // Note that we are not counting this request in our max number of requests to be issued refreshedmessage = getNewMsg(); try { sendAndReceive(refreshedmessage, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); return; // Something went wrong, no point continuing } // String mResBodyNormal = getBaseMsg().getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalUnstripped = refreshedmessage.getResponseBody().toString(); mResBodyNormalStripped = this.stripOff(mResBodyNormalUnstripped, origParamValue); if (!sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && doOrderByBased && countOrderByBasedRequests < doOrderByMaxRequests) { // ZAP: Removed getURLDecode() String modifiedParamValue = origParamValue + " ASC " + SQL_ONE_LINE_COMMENT; HttpMessage msg5 = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg5, param, modifiedParamValue); try { sendAndReceive(msg5, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msg5.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); return; // Something went wrong, no point continuing } countOrderByBasedRequests++; String modifiedAscendingOutputUnstripped = msg5.getResponseBody().toString(); String modifiedAscendingOutputStripped = stripOffOriginalAndAttackParam( modifiedAscendingOutputUnstripped, origParamValue, modifiedParamValue); // set up two little arrays to ease the work of checking the unstripped output, and // then the stripped output String normalBodyOutput[] = { mResBodyNormalUnstripped, mResBodyNormalStripped }; String ascendingBodyOutput[] = { modifiedAscendingOutputUnstripped, modifiedAscendingOutputStripped }; boolean strippedOutput[] = { false, true }; for (int booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex = 0; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex < 2; booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex++) { // if the results of the modified request match the original query, we may be // onto something. if (ascendingBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) == 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Check X, " + (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] ? "STRIPPED" : "UNSTRIPPED") + " html output for modified Order By parameter [" + modifiedParamValue + "] matched (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI()); } // confirm that a different parameter value generates different output, to // minimise false positives // use the descending order this time // ZAP: Removed getURLDecode() String modifiedParamValueConfirm = origParamValue + " DESC " + SQL_ONE_LINE_COMMENT; HttpMessage msg5Confirm = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msg5Confirm, param, modifiedParamValueConfirm); try { sendAndReceive(msg5Confirm, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msg5Confirm.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); continue; // Something went wrong, continue on to the next item in the // loop } countOrderByBasedRequests++; String confirmOrderByOutputUnstripped = msg5Confirm.getResponseBody().toString(); String confirmOrderByOutputStripped = stripOffOriginalAndAttackParam( confirmOrderByOutputUnstripped, origParamValue, modifiedParamValueConfirm); // set up two little arrays to ease the work of checking the unstripped // output or the stripped output String confirmOrderByBodyOutput[] = { confirmOrderByOutputUnstripped, confirmOrderByOutputStripped }; if (confirmOrderByBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex] .compareTo(normalBodyOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) != 0) { // the confirm query did not return the same results. This means that // arbitrary queries are not all producing the same page output. // this means the fact we earlier reproduced the original page output // with a modified parameter was not a coincidence // Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = null; if (strippedOutput[booleanStrippedUnstrippedIndex]) { extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( MESSAGE_PREFIX + "alert.orderbybased.extrainfo", modifiedParamValue, ""); } else { extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( MESSAGE_PREFIX + "alert.orderbybased.extrainfo", modifiedParamValue, "NOT "); } // raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication // Bypass" alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = modifiedParamValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, getName(), getDescription(), null, // url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), "", msg5); sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; break; // No further need to loop } } // bale out if we were asked nicely if (isStop()) { log.debug("Stopping the scan due to a user request"); return; } } } // ############################### // if a sql injection was found, we should check if the page is flagged as a login page // in any of the contexts. if it is, raise an "SQL Injection - Authentication Bypass" // alert in addition to the alerts already raised if (sqlInjectionFoundForUrl) { boolean loginUrl = false; // log.debug("### A SQL Injection may lead to auth bypass.."); // are we dealing with a login url in any of the contexts? ExtensionAuthentication extAuth = (ExtensionAuthentication) Control.getSingleton() .getExtensionLoader().getExtension(ExtensionAuthentication.NAME); if (extAuth != null) { URI requestUri = getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI(); // using the session, get the list of contexts for the url List<Context> contextList = extAuth.getModel().getSession() .getContextsForUrl(requestUri.getURI()); // now loop, and see if the url is a login url in each of the contexts in turn.. for (Context context : contextList) { URI loginUri = extAuth.getLoginRequestURIForContext(context); if (loginUri != null) { if (requestUri.getScheme().equals(loginUri.getScheme()) && requestUri.getHost().equals(loginUri.getHost()) && requestUri.getPort() == loginUri.getPort() && requestUri.getPath().equals(loginUri.getPath())) { // we got this far.. only the method (GET/POST), user details, query // params, fragment, and POST params // are possibly different from the login page. loginUrl = true; // DEBUG only // log.debug("##### The right login page was found"); break; } else { // log.debug("#### This is not the login page you're looking for"); } } else { // log.debug("### This context has no login page set"); } } } if (loginUrl) { // log.debug("##### Raising auth bypass"); // raise the alert, using the custom name and description String vulnname = Constant.messages.getString(MESSAGE_PREFIX + "authbypass.name"); String vulndesc = Constant.messages.getString(MESSAGE_PREFIX + "authbypass.desc"); // raise the alert, using the attack string stored earlier for this purpose bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, vulnname, vulndesc, refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), // url param, sqlInjectionAttack, "", getSolution(), "", getBaseMsg()); } // not a login page } // no sql Injection Found For Url } catch (InvalidRedirectLocationException e) { // Not an error, just means we probably attacked the redirect location } catch (Exception e) { // Do not try to internationalise this.. we need an error message in any event.. // if it's in English, it's still better than not having it at all. log.error("An error occurred checking a url for SQL Injection vulnerabilities", e); } }
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.ascanrules.TestSQLInjection.java
private void expressionBasedAttack(String param, String originalParam, String modifiedParamValue, String modifiedParamValueConfirm) throws IOException { // those of you still paying attention will note that if handled as expressions (such as by // a database), these represent the same value. HttpMessage msg = getNewMsg();/*from ww w. j av a 2 s .com*/ setParameter(msg, param, modifiedParamValue); try { sendAndReceive(msg, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msg.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); return; // Something went wrong, no point continuing } countExpressionBasedRequests++; String modifiedExpressionOutputUnstripped = msg.getResponseBody().toString(); String modifiedExpressionOutputStripped = stripOffOriginalAndAttackParam(modifiedExpressionOutputUnstripped, originalParam, modifiedParamValue); String normalBodyOutput = mResBodyNormalStripped; if (!sqlInjectionFoundForUrl && countExpressionBasedRequests < doExpressionMaxRequests) { // if the results of the modified request match the original query, we may be onto // something. if (modifiedExpressionOutputStripped.compareTo(normalBodyOutput) == 0) { if (this.debugEnabled) { log.debug("Check 4, STRIPPED html output for modified expression parameter [" + modifiedParamValue + "] matched (refreshed) original results for " + refreshedmessage.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); } // confirm that a different parameter value generates different output, to minimise // false positives // this time param value will be different to original value and mismatch is // expected in responses of original and this value // Note that the two values are NOT equivalent, and the param value is different to // the original HttpMessage msgConfirm = getNewMsg(); setParameter(msgConfirm, param, modifiedParamValueConfirm); try { sendAndReceive(msgConfirm, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (SocketException ex) { if (log.isDebugEnabled()) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msgConfirm.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); return; // Something went wrong } countExpressionBasedRequests++; String confirmExpressionOutputUnstripped = msgConfirm.getResponseBody().toString(); String confirmExpressionOutputStripped = stripOffOriginalAndAttackParam( confirmExpressionOutputUnstripped, originalParam, modifiedParamValueConfirm); if (confirmExpressionOutputStripped.compareTo(normalBodyOutput) != 0) { // the confirm query did not return the same results. This means that arbitrary // queries are not all producing the same page output. // this means the fact we earier reproduced the original page output with a // modified parameter was not a coincidence // Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = Constant.messages .getString(MESSAGE_PREFIX + "alert.expressionbased.extrainfo", modifiedParamValue, ""); // raise the alert, and save the attack string for the "Authentication Bypass" // alert, if necessary sqlInjectionAttack = modifiedParamValue; bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, getName(), getDescription(), null, // url param, sqlInjectionAttack, extraInfo, getSolution(), "", msg); // SQL Injection has been found sqlInjectionFoundForUrl = true; return; } } // bale out if we were asked nicely if (isStop()) { return; } } }
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.ascanrulesBeta.SQLInjectionHypersonic.java
/** * scans for SQL Injection vulnerabilities, using Hypersonic specific syntax. If it doesn't use * specifically Hypersonic syntax, it does not belong in here, but in SQLInjection *//*from w w w.j a va2s .com*/ @Override public void scan(HttpMessage originalMessage, String paramName, String paramValue) { // DEBUG only // log.setLevel(org.apache.log4j.Level.DEBUG); // this.debugEnabled = true; try { // Timing Baseline check: we need to get the time that it took the original query, to // know if the time based check is working correctly.. HttpMessage msgTimeBaseline = getNewMsg(); long originalTimeStarted = System.currentTimeMillis(); try { sendAndReceive(msgTimeBaseline, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (java.net.SocketTimeoutException e) { // to be expected occasionally, if the base query was one that contains some // parameters exploiting time based SQL injection? if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The Base Time Check timed out on [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] URL [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI() + "]"); } catch (SocketException ex) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString() + " for Base Time Check"); return; // No need to keep going } long originalTimeUsed = System.currentTimeMillis() - originalTimeStarted; // end of timing baseline check int countUnionBasedRequests = 0; int countTimeBasedRequests = 0; if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Scanning URL [" + getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] [" + getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI() + "], field [" + paramName + "] with value [" + paramValue + "] for SQL Injection"); // Hypersonic specific time based SQL injection checks for (int timeBasedSQLindex = 0; timeBasedSQLindex < SQL_HYPERSONIC_TIME_REPLACEMENTS.length && doTimeBased && countTimeBasedRequests < doTimeMaxRequests; timeBasedSQLindex++) { HttpMessage msgAttack = getNewMsg(); String newTimeBasedInjectionValue = SQL_HYPERSONIC_TIME_REPLACEMENTS[timeBasedSQLindex] .replace(ORIG_VALUE_TOKEN, paramValue).replace(SLEEP_TOKEN, Integer.toString(sleep)); setParameter(msgAttack, paramName, newTimeBasedInjectionValue); // send it. long modifiedTimeStarted = System.currentTimeMillis(); try { sendAndReceive(msgAttack, false); // do not follow redirects countTimeBasedRequests++; } catch (java.net.SocketTimeoutException e) { // this is to be expected, if we start sending slow queries to the database. // ignore it in this case.. and just get the time. if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The time check query timed out on [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] URL [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI() + "] on field: [" + paramName + "]"); } catch (SocketException ex) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString() + " for time check query"); return; // No need to keep going } long modifiedTimeUsed = System.currentTimeMillis() - modifiedTimeStarted; if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Time Based SQL Injection test: [" + newTimeBasedInjectionValue + "] on field: [" + paramName + "] with value [" + newTimeBasedInjectionValue + "] took " + modifiedTimeUsed + "ms, where the original took " + originalTimeUsed + "ms"); if (modifiedTimeUsed >= (originalTimeUsed + sleep)) { // takes more than 5 (by default) extra seconds => likely time based SQL // injection. Raise it String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanbeta.sqlinjection.alert.timebased.extrainfo", newTimeBasedInjectionValue, modifiedTimeUsed, paramValue, originalTimeUsed); String attack = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.attack", paramName, newTimeBasedInjectionValue); // raise the alert bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, getName() + " - Time Based", getDescription(), getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), // url paramName, attack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msgAttack); if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { log.debug("A likely Time Based SQL Injection Vulnerability has been found with [" + msgAttack.getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] URL [" + msgAttack.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI() + "] on field: [" + paramName + "]"); } return; } // query took longer than the amount of time we attempted to retard it by } // for each time based SQL index // end of check for time based SQL Injection } catch (InvalidRedirectLocationException e) { // Not an error, just means we probably attacked the redirect location } catch (Exception e) { // Do not try to internationalise this.. we need an error message in any event.. // if it's in English, it's still better than not having it at all. log.error("An error occurred checking a url for Hypersonic SQL Injection vulnerabilities", e); } }
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.ascanrulesBeta.SQLInjectionMySQL.java
/** * scans for SQL Injection vulnerabilities, using MySQL specific syntax. If it doesn't use * specifically MySQL syntax, it does not belong in here, but in TestSQLInjection *///from w w w.jav a2 s. c o m @Override public void scan(HttpMessage originalMessage, String paramName, String originalParamValue) { try { // Timing Baseline check: we need to get the time that it took the original query, to // know if the time based check is working correctly.. HttpMessage msgTimeBaseline = getNewMsg(); long originalTimeStarted = System.currentTimeMillis(); try { sendAndReceive(msgTimeBaseline, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (java.net.SocketTimeoutException e) { // to be expected occasionally, if the base query was one that contains some // parameters exploiting time based SQL injection? if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The Base Time Check timed out on [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] URL [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI() + "]"); } catch (SocketException ex) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); return; // No need to keep going } long originalTimeUsed = System.currentTimeMillis() - originalTimeStarted; // if the time was very slow (because JSP was being compiled on first call, for // instance) // then the rest of the time based logic will fail. Lets double-check for that scenario // by requesting the url again. // If it comes back in a more reasonable time, we will use that time instead as our // baseline. If it come out in a slow fashion again, // we will abort the check on this URL, since we will only spend lots of time trying // request, when we will (very likely) not get positive results. if (originalTimeUsed > sleep * 1000) { long originalTimeStarted2 = System.currentTimeMillis(); try { sendAndReceive(msgTimeBaseline, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (java.net.SocketTimeoutException e) { // to be expected occasionally, if the base query was one that contains some // parameters exploiting time based SQL injection? if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug( "Base Time Check 2 timed out on [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] URL [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI() + "]"); } catch (SocketException ex) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); return; // No need to keep going } long originalTimeUsed2 = System.currentTimeMillis() - originalTimeStarted2; if (originalTimeUsed2 > sleep * 1000) { // no better the second time around. we need to bale out. if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Both base time checks 1 and 2 for [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] URL [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI() + "] are way too slow to be usable for the purposes of checking for time based SQL Injection checking. We are aborting the check on this particular url."); return; } else { // phew. the second time came in within the limits. use the later timing // details as the base time for the checks. originalTimeUsed = originalTimeUsed2; originalTimeStarted = originalTimeStarted2; } } // end of timing baseline check int countTimeBasedRequests = 0; if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Scanning URL [" + getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] [" + getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI() + "], [" + paramName + "] with value [" + originalParamValue + "] for SQL Injection"); // MySQL specific time-based SQL injection checks for (int timeBasedSQLindex = 0; timeBasedSQLindex < SQL_MYSQL_TIME_REPLACEMENTS.length && doTimeBased && countTimeBasedRequests < doTimeMaxRequests; timeBasedSQLindex++) { HttpMessage msg3 = getNewMsg(); String newTimeBasedInjectionValue = SQL_MYSQL_TIME_REPLACEMENTS[timeBasedSQLindex] .replace(ORIG_VALUE_TOKEN, originalParamValue) .replace(SLEEP_TOKEN, Integer.toString(sleep)); setParameter(msg3, paramName, newTimeBasedInjectionValue); // send it. long modifiedTimeStarted = System.currentTimeMillis(); try { sendAndReceive(msg3, false); // do not follow redirects countTimeBasedRequests++; } catch (java.net.SocketTimeoutException e) { // to be expected occasionally, if the contains some parameters exploiting time // based SQL injection if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The time check query timed out on [" + msg3.getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] URL [" + msg3.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI() + "] on field: [" + paramName + "]"); } catch (SocketException ex) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msg3.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); return; // No need to keep going } long modifiedTimeUsed = System.currentTimeMillis() - modifiedTimeStarted; if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Time Based SQL Injection test: [" + newTimeBasedInjectionValue + "] on field: [" + paramName + "] with value [" + newTimeBasedInjectionValue + "] took " + modifiedTimeUsed + "ms, where the original took " + originalTimeUsed + "ms"); // add some small leeway on the time, since adding a 5 (by default) second delay in // the SQL query will not cause the request // to take a full 5 (by default) seconds longer to run than the original.. if (modifiedTimeUsed >= (originalTimeUsed + (sleep * 1000) - 200)) { // takes more than 5 (by default) extra seconds => likely time based SQL // injection. Raise it // Likely a SQL Injection. Raise it String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanbeta.sqlinjection.alert.timebased.extrainfo", newTimeBasedInjectionValue, modifiedTimeUsed, originalParamValue, originalTimeUsed); // raise the alert bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, getName(), getDescription(), getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), // url paramName, newTimeBasedInjectionValue, extraInfo, getSolution(), msg3); if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("A likely Time Based SQL Injection Vulnerability has been found with [" + msg3.getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] URL [" + msg3.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI() + "] on field: [" + paramName + "]"); return; } // query took longer than the amount of time we attempted to retard it by // bale out if we were asked nicely if (isStop()) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Stopping the scan due to a user request"); return; } } // for each time based SQL index // end of check for MySQL time based SQL Injection } catch (InvalidRedirectLocationException e) { // Not an error, just means we probably attacked the redirect location } catch (Exception e) { // Do not try to internationalise this.. we need an error message in any event.. // if it's in English, it's still better than not having it at all. log.error("An error occurred checking a url for MySQL SQL Injection vulnerabilities", e); } }
From source file:org.zaproxy.zap.extension.ascanrulesBeta.SQLInjectionPostgresql.java
/** * scans for SQL Injection vulnerabilities, using POSTGRES specific syntax. If it doesn't use * specifically POSTGRES syntax, it does not belong in here, but in SQLInjection *///w w w . j a va 2 s . c om @Override public void scan(HttpMessage originalMessage, String paramName, String paramValue) { // DEBUG only // log.setLevel(org.apache.log4j.Level.DEBUG); // this.debugEnabled = true; try { // Timing Baseline check: we need to get the time that it took the original query, to // know if the time based check is working correctly.. HttpMessage msgTimeBaseline = getNewMsg(); long originalTimeStarted = System.currentTimeMillis(); try { sendAndReceive(msgTimeBaseline, false); // do not follow redirects } catch (java.net.SocketTimeoutException e) { // to be expected occasionally, if the base query was one that contains some // parameters exploiting time based SQL injection? if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The Base Time Check timed out on [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] URL [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI() + "]"); } catch (SocketException ex) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); return; // No need to keep going } long originalTimeUsed = System.currentTimeMillis() - originalTimeStarted; // end of timing baseline check int countTimeBasedRequests = 0; if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Scanning URL [" + getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] [" + getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI() + "], field [" + paramName + "] with original value [" + paramValue + "] for SQL Injection"); // POSTGRES specific time based SQL injection checks for (int timeBasedSQLindex = 0; timeBasedSQLindex < SQL_POSTGRES_TIME_REPLACEMENTS.length && doTimeBased && countTimeBasedRequests < doTimeMaxRequests; timeBasedSQLindex++) { HttpMessage msgAttack = getNewMsg(); String newTimeBasedInjectionValue = SQL_POSTGRES_TIME_REPLACEMENTS[timeBasedSQLindex] .replace(ORIG_VALUE_TOKEN, paramValue).replace(SLEEP_TOKEN, Integer.toString(sleep)); setParameter(msgAttack, paramName, newTimeBasedInjectionValue); // send it. long modifiedTimeStarted = System.currentTimeMillis(); try { sendAndReceive(msgAttack, false); // do not follow redirects countTimeBasedRequests++; } catch (java.net.SocketTimeoutException e) { // this is to be expected, if we start sending slow queries to the database. // ignore it in this case.. and just get the time. if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("The time check query timed out on [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] URL [" + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI() + "] on field: [" + paramName + "]"); } catch (SocketException ex) { if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Caught " + ex.getClass().getName() + " " + ex.getMessage() + " when accessing: " + msgTimeBaseline.getRequestHeader().getURI().toString()); return; // No need to keep going } long modifiedTimeUsed = System.currentTimeMillis() - modifiedTimeStarted; if (this.debugEnabled) log.debug("Time Based SQL Injection test: [" + newTimeBasedInjectionValue + "] on field: [" + paramName + "] with value [" + newTimeBasedInjectionValue + "] took " + modifiedTimeUsed + "ms, where the original took " + originalTimeUsed + "ms"); if (modifiedTimeUsed >= (originalTimeUsed + (sleep * 1000))) { // takes more than 5 (by default) extra seconds => likely time based SQL // injection. Raise it String extraInfo = Constant.messages.getString( "ascanbeta.sqlinjection.alert.timebased.extrainfo", newTimeBasedInjectionValue, modifiedTimeUsed, paramValue, originalTimeUsed); String attack = Constant.messages.getString("ascanbeta.sqlinjection.alert.booleanbased.attack", paramName, newTimeBasedInjectionValue); // raise the alert bingo(Alert.RISK_HIGH, Alert.CONFIDENCE_MEDIUM, getName() + " - Time Based", getDescription(), getBaseMsg().getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI(), // url paramName, attack, extraInfo, getSolution(), msgAttack); if (log.isDebugEnabled()) { log.debug("A likely Time Based SQL Injection Vulnerability has been found with [" + msgAttack.getRequestHeader().getMethod() + "] URL [" + msgAttack.getRequestHeader().getURI().getURI() + "] on field: [" + paramName + "]"); } return; } // query took longer than the amount of time we attempted to retard it by } // for each time based SQL index // end of check for time based SQL Injection } catch (InvalidRedirectLocationException e) { // Not an error, just means we probably attacked the redirect location } catch (Exception e) { // Do not try to internationalise this.. we need an error message in any event.. // if it's in English, it's still better than not having it at all. log.error("An error occurred checking a url for POSTGRES SQL Injection vulnerabilities", e); } }